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 Abstract— In this paper a randomness evaluation of a block 
cipher for secure image communication is presented. The GFHT 
cipher is a genetic algorithm, that combines gene fusion (GF) and 
horizontal gene transfer (HGT) both inspired from antibiotic 
resistance in bacteria. The symmetric encryption key is generated 
by four pairs of chromosomes with multi-layer random sequences. 
The encryption starts by a GF of the principal key-agent in a single 
block, then HGT performs obfuscation where the genes are pixels 
and the chromosomes are the rows and columns. A Salt extracted 
from the image hash-value is used to implement one-time pad 
(OTP) scheme, hence a modification of one pixel generates a 
different encryption key without changing the main passphrase or 
key. Therefore, an extreme avalanche effect of 99% is achieved. 
Randomness evaluation based on random matrix theory, power 
spectral density, avalanche effect, 2D autocorrelation, pixels ran-
domness tests and chi-square hypotheses testing show that 
encrypted images adopt the statistical behavior of uniform white 
noise; hence validating the theoretical model by experimental 
results. Moreover, performance comparison with chaos-genetic 
ciphers shows the merit of the GFHT algorithm. 
Keywords— genetic algorithm; cryptography; random matrix 
theory; power spectral density; 2D cross-correlation. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ECURITY has become a key issue in the virtual world of 
modern life due to the global connectivity which has crucial 
implications on sensitive information being within reach of 
possible remote malicious entities. Therefore, the viability of the 
information society relies upon a high degree of security insured 
by the deployment of novel algorithms in computational and 
artificial intelligence reinforced by molecular biology inspired 
schemes. In fact, advances in artificial intelligence towards 
automated cryptanalysis together with the continuous evolution 
and increased computing power endanger secure communica-
tions that rely heavily upon algorithms and their resistance to 
cryptanalysis attacks. On the other hand, the state of the art 
cryptographic algorithms surpassed the performance of a mathe-
matical structured algorithms [1], by exploiting natural com-
plexity upon which is based genetic structures of biological 
organisms and their evolution [2], [3]. Indeed, novel algorithms 
are required to overcome the rapid growth of computational 
power and intelligence which makes modern cryptographic 
algorithms keep getting broken.  
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The continuous spread of digital images; from military, 
medical, commercial to private usage, makes them a cornerstone 
in modern digital communication. Moreover, images are also 
excellent media for covert communication by steganography 
[4]-[7]. Image encryption finds its application alongside with 
steganography for data hiding in encrypted images. In [8], 
authors propose to consider the patch-level sparse representa-
tion, with the objective of better exploring the correlation 
between neighbor pixels where the leading residual errors are 
encoded and self-embedded within the cover image. In [9] a 
private key cryptosystem based on the finite-field wavelet is 
presented. The encryption and decryption are performed by the 
synthesis and analysis banks of the nonlinear finite-field wavelet 
transform; whose filter coefficients are determined by the keys 
of the users. Under the assumption of plaintext attacks, the 
security of a diffusion mechanism used as the core crypto-
graphic primitive in some image cryptosystems based on chaotic 
orbits and quantum walks is investigated in [10]. The proposed 
analysis is validated by numerical examples. Moreover, the im-
portance and feasibility of applying a joint signal processing and 
cryptographic approach to multimedia encryption is discussed 
in [11]. 
The rapid growing in bio-inspired computation opens the 
doors to use its natural complexity in cryptographic field. The 
DNA computing cryptography along with chaos theory are an 
emerging and very promising direction in cryptography 
research. In [12] authors proposed an image cipher with 
combined permutation and diffusion; first, the image is parti-
tioned into blocks, then a spatiotemporal chaos is employed to 
shuffle the blocks and change the pixels’ values. Wang et al. 
presented a scheme based on DNA sequence operations and a 
chaotic system; in first phase, they perform bitwise XOR 
operation on the pixels of the plain image by the spatiotemporal 
chaos system, then, in a second phase a matrix is obtained by 
encoding the confused image using a DNA encoding rule and 
finally, a new initial condition of a coupled map lattice is 
generated according to the DNA matrix [13]. In [14] authors 
presented a DNA encryption based on one-time pads. They 
detailed the procedure for two one-time-pads encryption 
schemes where a substitution method uses libraries of distinct 
pads, each of which defines a specific, randomly generated, pair-
wise mapping; and an XOR scheme utilizing molecular 
computation with indexed random key strings. Genetic cryptog-
raphy has also been used for ad-hoc networks, secure data 
transfer or protecting multimedia information [15]. Many 
research works have been performed on combining chaos theory 
with DNA sequencing for the purpose of image encryption with 
results comparison of several two-dimensional chaotic maps 
[16]-[19]. 
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 Regarding security analysis based on randomness evaluation, 
authors in [20] studied the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) 
randomness test NIST-SP-800-22 released by the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology. They proved that a 
power spectrum, which is a component of the test statistic, 
follows a chi-squared distribution, the effectiveness of their 
approach was verified by experimental results. Other works 
dealing with image encryption investigate reaction-diffusion 
neural networks application in secure image communications 
[21] and combining secret image sharing with image encryption 
[22]. In [23] security evaluations of a class of randomized 
encryption schemes are performed employing an information-
theoretic approach.  
This paper presents randomness evaluation of the GFHT 
algorithm for image communication with OTP scheme. A 
preliminary introduction of the present GFHT algorithm was 
reported in [24] while an application in biomedical wireless 
sensor network gateway with simulation and experimental 
results was presented in [25], where the GFHT algorithm out-
performs the most widely used conventional ciphers in 
avalanche effect and was ranked second in terms of speed, after 
AES algorithm. The signal processing approach for security 
analysis presented hereinafter, is based on random matrix theory 
circular law, power spectral density, avalanche effect, 2-D 
autocorrelation, pixels randomness tests and chi-square, 2, 
hypotheses testing. Moreover, performance comparison with 
some genetic and chaos theory algorithms is presented. Beside 
its genetic scheme, the GFHT offers the feature of an OTP since 
every image is encrypted with different key, while keeping the 
main passphrase unchanged. The paper is organized as follows: 
Section II, presents the GFHT algorithm and its model. Section 
III carries out the cipher randomness analysis showing 
mathematical foundations on randomness of encrypted images. 
In section IV comprehensive results analysis of the GFHT 
algorithm is provided reinforced by extended comparison with 
chaos and genetic algorithms. Finally, a conclusion on the 
present contribution is provided in section V.  
II.  GENETIC ALGORITHM: KEYS GENERATION AND 
ENCRYPTION PROCESS 
The GFHT algorithm [24] is divided into two stages; the 
OTP keys generation process and a round-based encryption 
process. For the Keys Generation, the same passphrase 
generates different key for each encrypted image. The principal 
key and sub-keys V_Key, H_Key are given.  
𝑷_𝑲𝒆𝒚 = 𝑽_𝑲𝒆𝒚் ∗ 𝑯_𝑲𝒆𝒚 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 256)  (1) 
𝑽_𝑲𝒆𝒚 = [𝑎ଵ … 𝑎௜ … 𝑎ே]   (2) 
𝑯_𝑲𝒆𝒚 = [𝑏ଵ … 𝑏௝ … 𝑏ெ]   (3) 
 
For Gene Fusion and Horizontal Gene Transfer, the principal 
key, P_Key, will act as a pathogen, by introducing gene fusion 
into the image. The R layer key is the same principal key; the 
G layer key is obtained by a 3 bits’ reversal (bases reversal) 
and the B layer key is a 6 bits’ reversal as given by (4).  
𝑷_𝑲𝒆𝒚 = ቐ
𝑷𝑲𝒆𝒚𝟎 0𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠 ⊗ 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑹
𝑷𝑲𝒆𝒚𝟑 3𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠 ⊗ 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑮 
𝑷𝑲𝒆𝒚𝟔 6𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠 ⊗ 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑩 
   (4) 
 A genetic crossover operator (⊗) defines the permutation 
of rows of a matrix I as: n(l)  V_Key(m(l-1)) and the permutation 
of columns as: q(l)  H_Key(p(l-1)). The full crossover operator 
of an image I at round l, is defined by (5). The symbol (:) 
indicates an unchanged state of the corresponding row or 
column.  
⊗ {𝑰}(௟)(𝑛, 𝑞) ≝ ቊ
𝑰(௟)(𝑚, : ) 𝑰(௟ିଵ)(𝑽_𝑲𝒆𝒚(𝑚), : ) 1 ≤ 𝑚 ≤ 𝑀
𝑰(௟)(: , 𝑝) 𝑰(௟ିଵ)൫: , 𝑯_𝑲𝒆𝒚(𝑝)൯ 1 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 𝑁       (5) 
The multi-round recursive encryption process at round l, is 
defined by (6). 
 𝑰(𝒍) = ൝
𝑹(𝒍)
𝑮(𝒍)
𝑩(𝒍)
=⊗ ൞
𝑹(𝒍ି𝟏)𝑷𝑲𝒆𝒚𝟎
𝑮(𝒍ି𝟏)𝑷𝑲𝒆𝒚𝟑
𝑩(𝒍ି𝟏)𝑷𝑲𝒆𝒚𝟔
ൢ
(௟ିଵ)
1 ≤ 𝑙 ≤ 𝐿 (6) 
 The nonlinear mapping permutation keys are used to swap 
rows and columns at round l, using (7) and (8) given below: 
𝑛(௟) = 𝑽_𝑲𝒆𝒚(𝑚(௟ିଵ))   (7) 
𝑞(௟) = 𝑯_𝑲𝒆𝒚(𝑝(௟ିଵ))        (8) 
The pixels of IR, IG and IB are encrypted recursively from the 
round 0 of unencrypted pixels to round L of fully encrypted 
pixels. Each pixel is encrypted, moved, re-encrypted with 
different values in the P_Key matrix, where positions are 
controlled with the V_Key and H_Key sub-keys. Equations (9), 
(10) and (11) describe the process. The superscripts indicate the 
round number. Each RGB layer is encrypted by its P_Key 
matrix. Values of n and q are given by (7) and (8).  
𝑰ோ
(௅)(𝑚, 𝑝) =⊗ ൜… ⊗ ቄ⊗ ቄ𝑰ோ
(଴)(𝑚, 𝑝)𝑷𝑲𝒆𝒚𝟎ቅ ൫𝑛
൫1൯, 𝑞൫1൯൯…  
𝑷𝑲𝒆𝒚𝟎ൟ൫𝑛
(ଶ), 𝑞(ଶ)൯…𝑷𝑲𝒆𝒚𝟎ൟ(𝑛
(௅), 𝑞(௅))  (9) 
𝑰ீ
(௅)(𝑚, 𝑝) =⊗ ൜… ⊗ ቄ⊗ ቄ𝑰ீ
(଴)(𝑚, 𝑝)𝑷𝑲𝒆𝒚𝟑ቅ ൫𝑛
൫1൯, 𝑞൫1൯൯…  
𝑷𝑲𝒆𝒚𝟑ൟ൫𝑛
(ଶ), 𝑞(ଶ)൯…𝑷𝑲𝒆𝒚𝟑ൟ(𝑛
(௅), 𝑞(௅))  (10) 
𝑰஻
(௅)(𝑚, 𝑝) =⊗ ൜… ⊗ ቄ⊗ ቄ𝑰஻
(଴)(𝑚, 𝑝)𝑷𝑲𝒆𝒚𝟔ቅ ൫𝑛
൫1൯, 𝑞൫1൯൯…  
𝑷𝑲𝒆𝒚𝟔ൟ൫𝑛
(ଶ), 𝑞(ଶ)൯…𝑷𝑲𝒆𝒚𝟔ൟ(𝑛
(௅), 𝑞(௅))  (11) 
III. ALGORITHM SECURITY ANALYSIS  
Randomness analysis of the GFHT algorithm is based on 
well-established metrics in image cryptography and random 
matrix theory presented in the following sub-sections 
3.1 Pixels Randomness Tests with NPCR and UACI 
 In order to provide a metric for differential pixels change, 
the Number of Pixels Change Rate (NPCR) and the Unified 
Average Changing Intensity (UACI) are adopted for describing 
the ability to resist the differential attack [29]. The NPCR metric 
is defined by: 
𝑁𝑃𝐶𝑅(%) =
∑ ஽(௜,௝)೔,ೕ
ெ.ே
100  (12) 
with pixels’ difference: 
𝐷(𝑖, 𝑗) = ൜0 𝑖𝑓 𝑰𝒄(𝑖, 𝑗) =  𝑰𝒄𝟏𝒑𝒙(𝑖, 𝑗)
1 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
  (13) 
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where M and N are the height and width of the image, 
respectively. Ic(i,j) and Ic1px(i,j) are the pixels in a cipher-image 
and the cipher-image after changing one pixel in the plaintext 
image respectively. In that regard a number of images are used 
for testing, in the results section, in order to obtain an average 
value of NPCR, where an extensive differential cryptanalysis is 
presented. Also, the UACI has been used to quantify the 
differential analysis between two images enciphered with 
random pixels change with an ideal value expected to oscillate 
around the value of 1/3 (see Appendix). The UACI is given by 
𝑈𝐴𝐶𝐼(%) = ଵ
ேெ ෍
|஼భ(௜,௝)ି஼మ(௜,௝)|
ଶହହ௜,௝
100   (14) 
where M, N, are the length and width of each image. C1 and C2 
are the enciphered images with random pixels change. 
3.2 Power Spectral Density  
A powerful signal processing space is the frequency domain 
where cipher randomness behavior is carried out by the analysis 
of the power spectral density of the process being considered. If 
the encryption process is random, then a constant density 
(dB/Hz) should be observed on the signal spectrum. Let x(n) be 
a discrete wide-sense stationary random process representing 
the encrypted data with autocorrelation function given by 
𝑟௫௫[𝑛, 𝑛 − 𝑙] = 𝑟௫[௡][𝑙] = 𝔼[𝑥[𝑛]𝑥∗[𝑛 − 𝑙]] (15)  
where 𝔼(. ) is the expectation function and the star superscript 
(.)* denotes the complex conjugate. Remember that a white noise 
𝑥[𝑛] has its expected value 𝔼[𝑥[𝑛]] = 0, and recall that 
independent variables have the autocorrelation 𝑟௫௫[𝑙] =
𝔼[𝑥[𝑛]𝑥[𝑛 − 𝑙]] for real signals and since the random samples 
inside 𝑥[𝑛] are independent, then the autocorrelation is the 
product of the individual expected values 𝑟௫௫[𝑙] =
𝔼[𝑥[𝑛]]. 𝔼[𝑥[𝑛 − 𝑙]] which concludes to:  
𝑟௫௫[𝑙] = ൜
𝔼[𝑥[𝑛]]𝔼[𝑥[𝑛 − 𝑙]] if 𝑙  0
𝔼[𝑥ଶ[𝑛]] if 𝑙 = 0  (16) 
thus, the following result, when verified, proves the pure 
randomness of a process: 𝑟௫௫[𝑙] = 𝜎ଶ [𝑙], where σ2 is the 
variance of the analyzed process and  is Dirac delta function 
with  [𝑙] = 1 for 𝑙 = 0 and  [𝑙] = 0 otherwise. Hence a null 
autocorrelation is the result of a pure random output, validating 
the security of the cipher scheme as it will be shown in the 
results section for both 1-D and 2-D. In the frequency domain, 
for each sample function of the process x[n], the truncated 
Discrete Fourier Transform, over a time slot T, is given by 
𝑋்[k] = ∑ 𝑥[𝑛]𝑒ି௝ଶ௞௡/ேேିଵ௡ୀ଴    (17) 
where k, n, N, are the discrete frequency, discrete time and the 
number of samples respectively. The corresponding truncated 
power spectral density is given by  
𝑃𝑆𝐷்[𝑘] =
ଵ
ே
|𝑋ே[𝑘]|ଶ   (18) 
since x[n] is a random process, for each discrete frequency, k, 
PSDT[k] is also a random univariate. Let us denote the 
expectation of truncated power spectral density by 
𝑃𝑆𝐷௫[௡],ே[𝑘] ≝ 𝔼 ቂ
ଵ
ே
|𝑋ே[𝑘]|ଶቃ  (19)  
and therefore, the power spectral density of the process is 
defined by  
𝑃𝑆𝐷௫[௡][𝑘] = limே→ஶ 𝑆௫[௡],ே[𝑘]   (20) 
The Wiener-Khintchin theorem states that the limit given by 
(20) exists for all discrete frequencies an its value for the discrete 
random process is given by the DFT of the autocorrelation 
function as  
𝑃𝑆𝐷௫[௡][𝑘] = ෍ 𝑟௫[௡][𝑙]𝑒ି௝ଶ௞௟/ே
ே
௟ୀିே
   (21) 
For a random process, the autocorrelation function shows an 
impulse at the origin (time delay l=0), which will be illustrated 
by a constant (flat) power spectral density over all the frequency 
range. Illustrations will be shown in section IV, subsection 4.2 
3.3 2-D Auto-Correlation Analysis 
The normalized auto-correlation coefficient, 𝜌, also known as 
Pearson's Correlation Coefficient (PCC), measures the strength 
of a linear relationship between two vectors or arrays; the value 
of 𝜌 always spans the interval [-1,1]. Consequently, in order to 
measure the dependability between pixels inside an image 
denoted by a matrix X, we perform three directional auto-
correlation measures on X; horizontal, vertical and diagonal 
auto-correlations. Let Xi,j be the reference matrix, to be 
correlated to a horizontally one-pixel shifted matrix, Y=Xi+1,j. 
The vertical one-pixel shifted matrix is defined by Y=Xi,j+1. The 
diagonal shifted matrix is defined by Y=Xi+1, j+1 (Fig.2). Three 
correlations are performed in order to measure the dependability 
of pixels. The covariance of two matrices X and Y normalized 
over their inter-energy, since the norm of a signal is defined as 
the square root of its total energy which provides the normalized 
correlation coefficient, 𝜌.  
𝜌௑,௒ =
ୡ୭୴(௑,௒)
ఙ೉ఙೊ
    (22)  
where cov(.) is the covariance function, 𝜎௑ is the standard 
deviation of the image X and 𝜎௒ is the standard deviation of the 
image Y. The covariance is given based on the Expectation and 
the mean values of the two images. 
cov(𝑋, 𝑌) = 𝔼[(𝑋 − 𝜇௑)(𝑌 − 𝜇௒)]   (23) 
where 𝜇௑ is the mean of the image X, and 𝜇௒ is the mean of the 
image Y. Data is shifted by subtracting their respective means 
in order to have an average of zero. 
𝜌௑,௒ =
∑ ൫௑೔,ೕିఓ೉൯೔,ೕ ൫௒೔,ೕିఓೊ൯
ට∑ ൫௑೔,ೕିఓ೉൯
మ
೔,ೕ ට∑ ൫௒೔,ೕିఓೊ൯
మ
೔,ೕ
        (24) 
 
Fig. 1. Directional autocorrelation. A-B: Horizontal autocorrelation, A-C: 
vertical autocorrelation and A-D: diagonal autocorrelation. 
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The analysis of the correlation coefficient will reveal the 
capability of the cipher to remove dependencies between 
adjacent pixels. A meaningful image always has a high 
correlation coefficient; practically in the range [0.7-1.0] 
depending on the class of image; natural scene, medical, 
synthetic etc. However, an ideal cipher should verify the null 
hypothesis; practically producing a coefficient that is less than 
0.01 as illustrated in the results section. Figure 1 shows how 
directional auto-correlation is performed; Matrix A is the 
original image (layer) reduced by one pixel in each direction, 
black squares are the pixels to be correlated while grey square 
are ignored pixels. Horizontal correlation is between A and B, 
vertical correlation is between A and C, and diagonal correlation 
is between A and D. 
IV.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In this section, results to evaluate the performance of the 
proposed algorithm are provided. Results are obtained with 
personal computer equipped with intel i7-4510U dual core 
processor and 16 GB of RAM running at 2.0 GHz under 
windows 10 pro 64-bit operating system.  To demonstrate the 
performance and effectiveness of the proposed cipher, results of 
different metrics are shown in sub-sections: 4.1 to 4.5.  
4.1 Random Matrix Theory 
An ideal RGB encrypted image is manifested by the behavior 
of the three layers acquiring the properties of random matrices, 
therefore, random matrix theory (RMT) is used to verify the 
effect of the genetic algorithm in producing random matrices. 
After, introducing RMT model for eigenvalues spectral distribu-
tion, the best way to validate this expectation is by experiments 
on RGB images. This is an effective way to contemplate the 
occurrence of convergence of the spectral distribution in 
encrypted images as random matrices outputs. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Fig. 2. Original test images. (a) Lena-1024, (b) Mushrooms, (c) X-ray, (d) 
Nature. 
Let 𝑿 = 𝑋ே(𝑖, 𝑗) ,1 ≤  𝑖, 𝑗 ≤N be a random matrix of size N×N, 
with eigenvalues vector 𝝀 = [𝜆ଵ ⋯ 𝜆ே]. A normalized 
random matrix X, X = {R, G, or B}, is defined by (25) 
𝑿௡ =
ଵ
√ே
𝑋ே(𝑖, 𝑗) , 1 ≤  𝑖, 𝑗 ≤N   (25) 
with zero mean 𝔼[𝑿௡] = 0 and a unit variance 𝔼ൣ𝑿௡ଶ൧ = 1. The 
eigenvalues spectral distribution is defined by (26) 
𝐺௡(𝑥, 𝑦) =
ଵ
ே
∑ 𝐼{ୖୣ{ఒೖ}ஸ௫,   ୍୫{ఒೖ}ஸ௬ }
ே
௞ୀଵ   (26) 
where 𝐼{.} denotes the occurrence of an event and the expectation 
of the spectral distribution function, 𝔼[𝐺௡(𝑥, 𝑦)], converges to a 
uniform distribution in the unit disk in ℝ2 [30]. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Fig. 3. HGT for the four test images of Fig. 2.  
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Fig. 4. Encryption using GF and HGT for images of Fig. 2. 
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Figure 3 shows HGT results on images in Fig.2, while Fig. 4 
shows the fully encrypted images. All RGB layers of the test 
images show uniform eigenvalues distribution inside a unit 
circle. This is illustrated in Fig. 5 by showing the eigenvalues 
distribution of both unencrypted and encrypted RGB layers of 
“Lena 400”. This uniform distribution carries out that the 
algorithm produces random matrices conform with RMT. The 
experimental testing of unencrypted and encrypted images 
concluded about the behavior of random outputs of the 
algorithm. In fact, while the eigenvalues of images in Fig.2 are 
randomly distributed in a two-dimensional complex space 
defined by the imaginary parts versus real parts, mainly 
concentrated around the origin (Fig.5- d, e, f), the normalized 
encrypted images in Fig.4 have a uniform distribution inside a 
unit circle (Fig.5- a, b, c). These results have decisive inference 
on encryption algorithm producing image layers following RMT 
circular law rules. The dyadic product P_Key in its three layers 
given by (5) produces three RGB encrypted layers, hence each 
layer is encrypted with a different version of the principal key.  
 
(a) Encrypted Red 
 
(b) Encrypted Green 
 
(c) Encrypted Blue 
(d) Unencrypted Red (e) Unencrypted Green 
 
(f) Unencrypted Blue 
Fig. 5. Eigenvalues spectral distribution. Encrypted RGB layers spectral distribution (a, b, c) and their corresponding unencrypted counterparts (d, e, f). 
 
In terms of computation speed GF is performed in 8ms per 
round (three layers) for an image of 1024×1024, and HGT is 
achieved in about 60ms. Figure 6 illustrates the eigenvalues 
distribution inside the unit circle. The R, G and B eigenvalues 
of the encrypted matrices coincide with the theoretical uniform 
normalized area distribution.  
 
Fig. 6. Uniform spectral distribution of eigenvalues coinciding with the 
theoretical uniform area distribution of a unit circle (Area=.radius2).  
The unencrypted layers have more than 75% of eigenvalues 
distributed inside 20% of the unit circle radius. 
4.2 Power Spectral Density 
A second characteristic illustrating the encrypted image as 
random process, is shown by a constant Power Spectral Density 
(PSD). The PSD is a metric representing the distribution of the 
signal average power as a function of spatial frequency, it is the 
average of the squared magnitude of the truncated Discrete 
Fourier Transform. The PSD is also obtained by the Fourier 
Transform of the autocorrelation function of the discrete Wide-
Sense Stationary (WSS) random process. Figure 7 depicts the 
flat envelope of the two-dimensional PSD for an image size 
1024×1024 pixels obtained by the two-dimensional Discrete 
Fourier Transform, the impulse at the 2D DFT represents the DC 
component of the spatial frequency space. Figure 8 illustrates 
the PSD estimate using the Welch spectral density estimation 
showing the spectrum from DC up to the maximum spatial 
frequency.  
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Fig. 7. Power spectral density as obtained by 2D DFT- RGB merged layers).  
The Welch periodogram uses a sliding window of 1024 
pixels and an overlap of 50%. The impulse at DC is the mean of 
the encrypted data. The encryption algorithm is generating data 
that is characterized as a white noise illustrated by a flat power 
spectral density across the full spatial frequency range. Figure 8 
illustrates the behavior of encrypted image RGB layers 
compared with white noise. The Welch PSD estimate of the 
encrypted image layers coincides with the PSD of a white noise 
at -25.7 dB/[Hz]. The wavering (ripples) of the encrypted image 
are within 0.15 dB for all RGB layers and white noise as shown 
by Fig.8 legend. 
 
Fig. 8. Welch periodogram of the power spectral density (PSD in dB/[Hz]) of 
encrypted data. PSD for image size of 1Megabyte. 
4.3 Avalanche Effect and Pixels Randomness Tests 
  Regarding the avalanche effect property, Table I shows the 
analysis of four images for the avalanche effect of the algorithm 
produced by the nullification of one arbitrary pixel in each test 
image. For each case, two keys (Keys: Key A and Key B), are 
generated by the algorithm using the same passphrase 
(password). Each key is obtained by the hash of the passphrase 
concatenated with le last 32bits of the hash of the image (salt). 
The metrics for pixels randomness tests are given by the NPCR 
and UACI. Figure 9 shows NPCR for 100 tests performed on 
RGB layers of twenty images, each one encrypted with different 
keys. The change of the salt produces an avalanche effect for the 
encrypted images with an average number of pixels change rate 
(NPCR %) of 99%. Analysis of the UACI is given in Fig.10 for 
100 tests on the RGB layers which provides an illustration of the 
validity of the cipher scheme with an average UACI of 33.45%. 
The latter value represents an accuracy of 99.64% relative to the 
ideal value. Despite the fact that the algorithm structure requires 
the exchange of a partial-hash value of the data block as a Salt 
along with the ciphertext, a brute force attack on the partial-hash 
value will not be feasible since it is only a portion in the 
reconstruction of the main key. Besides that, the algorithm 
structure protects the general key, since no direct hash is used or 
transmitted. Moreover, for the data partial hash, there is no 
known way to recover a full hash-value from one part of it. 
4.4 Scattering and Pearson Correlation Coefficient 
In order to observe the 2-D correlation, scatter images are 
useful for interpreting the trends in statistical data. Each 
observation (or point) in a scatter image has two coordinates; the 
first corresponds to the intensity of a pixel in the reference image 
while the second coordinate corresponds to the intensity of the 
corresponding adjacent pixel in the shifted image (horizontal, 
vertical or diagonal). The point representing that observation is 
placed at the intersection of the two coordinates. If the scattered 
data show a positive slope pattern as we move from left to right, 
this indicates a positive relationship between X and Y; an 
increase in one variable produces the increase of the correspond-
ing variable. If the scattered data do not seem to resemble any 
kind of pattern, then no relationship exists between X and Y and 
the analysis concludes about the pure randomness of the 
analyzed data. One pattern of special interest is the linear 
pattern, where the scattered data produces a cloud of points 
around the diagonal line; a cloud of points that has a general look 
of a line going uphill. Figure 11 (a, b, c), show the scatter points 
around the positive diagonal for the red, green and blue layers 
respectively (2D diagonal correlation). 
TABLE I: NUMBER OF PIXELS CHANGE RATE: THE PROPERTY OF 
AVALANCHE EFFECT PRODUCED BY A NULLIFICATION OF ONE ARBITRARY 
PIXEL IN EACH IMAGE OF FIG.2 (4 IMAGES) 
# Keys Key (Hash 256bit- SHA256)  NPCR% 
a Key A 1F2C065079577EBC4E688DCE5A6D19F56F
2A3419B3B1D272B0B4E9D2631D78B2 98.8 
Key B 488ABEE73637A70FA2593199764B1DA901
E22ABB32EEF63DD0F9DFAE09CA4E23 
b Key A 8F327415F2621DF3C76488EA7D170942FE5
AB3BB94770078D935B08F6B8E913B 96.4 
Key B 2FDE6840D2FAC6CAF6591B22521AA666E2
183A58677FF694FBDE69B1318560F4 
c Key A 42FE95556A24B1400B7BBC9D908D2FC250
67BE25AE4E611909AFEEF63A6C525B 97.4 
Key B 568BDB7629E428E6EF5655AEF27FCDFC53
49814174CD31E46A3193CE8754A03D 
d Key A 38595343C782167EF725AC07BF070BA2D90
5079753F382172FD3EFF60308276A 99.1 
Key B 9D88B446CBAB9DF39AF7270B412C9122C
B3E4BD2A12D844E7E1A8CE2FD3639B4 
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Fig. 9. Variation of the NPCR for 100 tests. The average NPCR for 100 tests is 
99.50 %.  
 
Fig. 10. UACI randomness test for red, green and blue layers.  
The RGB layers are analyzed for one-pixel shift 
autocorrelation in horizontal, vertical and diagonal directions. 
These layers are from the Fig.2 (b) Mushroom image chosen 
since it represents the wide class of synthetic images. The 
images are reduced to 256×256 to show granularity in the 
scattering images. The correlation between adjacent pixels 
provides a high PCC for meaningful images since the values of 
adjacent pixels are among a meaningful shape, pattern or color. 
An ideal cipher behavior should produce a cipher image 
having no correlation with adjacent pixels; hence it will serve as 
null Hypotheses testing. The correlation between a plain image 
and the adjacent or shifted counterpart will always produce 
scattered images that have high PCC, while the scattered 
analysis of cipher-images results in a pure noise image with no 
points cloud with a null PCC as shown in figures 11 (d, e, f). The 
PCC values for horizontally, vertically and diagonal directions 
are computed and shown in tables II and III for the RGB layers 
of plain images and cipher images. Further quantification and 
qualification analysis of images regarding pixel’s dependability 
may exploit the directional scattering intensity, scattered-data 
variance, and expectation values, in addition to the PCC. 
Statistical inference based on PCC before and after encryption 
is aimed to test the null hypothesis of the PCC for all RGB layers 
and with all directional shifts (horizontal, vertical and diagonal).  
Furthermore, The PCC obtained from a directional autocorrela-
tion may serve as a fast computational intelligence or a 
methodology of understanding to address the presence of mean-
ingful information inside a complex image of real-world 
problems to which mathematical or conventional modeling can 
be useless due the complexity of required mathematical 
reasoning algorithms. Therefore, the PCC which transforms data 
extracted from images into certain commonly understood 
parameters, acts as a descriptor, that makes subsequent decisions 
and classifications. The PCC descriptor is used in Table II to 
analyze the directional dependability of pixels’ intensity for the 
test images. Actually, the four test images represent four catego-
ries or classes of images; where “Lena-1024” represents the 
class of human photos, “Mushroom” represents the class of 
synthetic or computer made graphics, “X-Ray” represents the 
category of medical images such as X-ray [31], Medical 
Resonance Imaging (MRI) or Computerized Tomography (CT) 
and finally, “Nature” represents the class of natural views 
images. Among these four classes, “Nature” images have the 
lowest PCC while synthetic graphics have the highest PCC 
values. The maximum PCC values are shown in bold-font face 
in Table II while high PCC values appear in images that contain 
artificial objects or contain some regularities of color intensities 
in adjacent pixels. The PCC of the autocorrelation is greater than 
0.77 for all images. The null hypothesis is tested and verified 
with the PCC of encrypted images shown in Table III where all 
values are less than 0.0075 carrying out the fact that the cipher 
removes dependability between adjacent pixels. 
(a) Red (b) Green (c) Blue 
(d) Red (e) Green (f) Blue 
Fig. 11. Scattering images for diagonal autocorrelation for the red, green and 
blue layers (a, b, c) and their corresponding encrypted counterparts (d, e, f) 
A comparison of the proposed cipher performance with 
some DNA and chaos-theory based ciphers presented hereinaf-
ter uses a well-known test greyscale image. An RGB color 
image is built of three independent stacked color channels 
(layers), each of which representing value levels of the given 
channel; red, green and blue primary color components. For a 
comparison purpose with previous works results using DNA and 
chaos theory logistic maps cryptography [12], [13], [16], [19], 
the blue layer of “Lena-1024” is used as greyscale image 
(Fig.12).  A grayscale image as brightness component may also 
be obtained by a weighted colors conversion. Tables IV and V 
provide a performance comparison in term of directional 
correlation and randomness tests provided by NPCR and UCAI 
for “Lena” standard test image. 
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TABLE II: PLAIN IMAGE DIRECTIONAL AUTO-CORRELATION NORMALIZED COEFFICIENT 
  Horizontal Vertical Diagonal 
Images Red Green Blue Red Green Blue Red Green Blue 
Lena-1024 0.9862 0.9824 0.9792 0.9723 0.9650 0.9599 0.9582 0.9482 0.9412 
Mushroom 0.9794 0.9767 0.9613 0.9751 0.9710 0.9537 0.9597 0.9544 0.9298 
X-Ray 0. 9973 0. 9967 0. 9971 0. 9976 0. 9961 0. 9967 0. 9956 0. 9947 0. 9952 
Nature 0.8594 0.8685 0.8431 0.8538 0.8647 0.8362 0.7983 0.8107 0.7751 
TABLE III: CIPHER-IMAGE DIRECTIONAL AUTO-CORRELATION NORMALIZED COEFFICIENT 
  Horizontal Vertical Diagonal 
Images Red Green Blue Red Green Blue Red Green Blue 
Lena-1024 0.00025 -0.00059 0.004 -0.0013 -0.0016 -0.0012 0.00002 -0.00140 0.00060 
Mushroom 0.00036 0.0074 -0.0011 0.00510 0.0051 -0.0016 0.00740 -0.00430 0.00140 
X-Ray 0. 00100 0.0011 0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0007 0.00000 0.00000 0.00003 
Nature 0.00068 -0.0017 0.0051 -0.00420 -0.0016 0.0040 -0.00260 -0.00032 0.00700 
TABLE IV: CIPHERS COMAPAISON OF CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
FOR LENA-GREYSCALE IN FIG.2-A  
Algorithm Horizontal Vertical Diagonal Average 
None  0.9792 0.9599 0.9412 0.9601 
GFHT 0.0040 -0.0012 0.0006 0.0019 
Wang [12] 0.0010 0.0022 0.0150 0.0061 
Wang [13] 0.0021 0.0018 0.0014 0.0018 
Liu [16]  0.0004 0.0021 0.0038 0.0021 
Wei [19] 0.00062 0.0052 0.0069 0.0042 
As confirmed by the results of the performance tests 
provided by table IV and V, the proposed GFHT cipher achieved 
high degree of security with characteristics similar to DNA 
coding and chaos theory logistic maps cryptography. To verify 
this assertion, the UACI, NPCR and average PCC provide values 
approaching theoretical limits of uniform white noise behavior 
for enciphered images applied for both color and greyscale 
images.  
TABLE V: CIPHERS COMAPAISON FOR NPCR AND UACI FOR LENA-
GREYSCALE  
Algorithm NPCR (%) UACI (%) 
GFHT 99.50 33.45 
Wang [12] 99.58 33.56 
Wang [13] 99.65 33.48 
Liu [16]  99.60 28.13 
Wei [19] 99.21 33.28 
The Blue layer taken as a grayscale was chosen since it 
provides similar auto-correlation coefficients comparted to 
those used for ciphers comparison in [12]. While GFHT cipher 
provides similar average characteristics as Wang et al. [13], it 
supersedes results provides by other works [12], [16], [19]. 
(a) Red layer (b) Green layer (c) Blue layer (d) Grayscale 
Fig. 12. RGB decomposition of “Lena-1024”. The Blue layer is used as 
grayscale image for ciphers comparison in tables IV and V. Image resolution is 
reduced to 256×256 for comparison purpose. 
4.5 Chi-Square,  2, Hypotheses testing 
Chi-square, χ², is used to test hypotheses (H0|H1) about the 
observations to fit uniform distribution. The null hypothesis, H0, 
is the assumption that the observed samples (Oi) are similar to 
the expected values (Ei), which manifests with χ² = 0 with high 
cumulative density function (CDF), and the null hypothesis is 
accepted. In contrast, if the observed samples are different from 
the expected ones, the value of χ² increases and HO is rejected if 
the p-value falls below the significance level which is the 
probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true (H0: 
Oi=Ei, H1: OiEi). χ² is based on the sums of squares of 
distributed variables (Oi−Ei) where the discrete statistic, is based 
on a finite number of samples, K, grouped into a set of bins. χ² 
is given by the cumulative test statistic 
 ଶ = ෍ (ை೔ିா೔)
మ
ா೔
௄
௜ୀଵ
   (27) 
The larger the value of χ², the more likely is that the distribu-
tions are significantly different. 𝑝 = Pr[X ≥ χଶ] and the CDF 
with a degree of freedom (DOF), v=bins-1, is given by (28)  
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𝑝 = 𝐹(𝑥, 𝑣) = න ௧
(ೡషమ)/మ௘ష೟/మ
ଶೡ/మ(௩/ଶ)
௫
଴
𝑑𝑡  (28) 
where (.) is the Gamma function and Pr(.) is the probability. 
To implement this statistical test for encrypted RGB layers, 
a sliding window of size K, of 300, 600, or 900 is used with three 
possible data scanline directions; horizontal, vertical or diagonal 
scanline (a.k.a. zigzag). The rate of Goodness of Fit (RGOF) is the 
ratio of the number of accepted H0 over the total number of 
tested sliding windows. Figure 13 illustrates a result of the χ² 
hypotheses testing for “Lena-400×400”, where H0 rates, RGOF, 
are 98.56%, 99.25%, 99.12% in horizontal, vertical and diagonal 
scanline respectively, for K=600, which validates the cipher as 
a scheme producing encrypted data adopting a uniform 
distribution. The figure also shows the normalized expected 
values (pixel’s value/255) of encrypted pixels over the sliding 
windows indices. The number of sliding windows is: 𝑁௪ =
3. 𝐼ு𝐼௪ 𝑟. 𝐾⁄ , where IH, IW and r are image height, image width 
and window overlap ratio respectively. The calculated H0 
rejection rates (1-RGOF) of 0.0075, 0.0088 and 0.0144 (from 
1599 sliding window 23, 12 and 14 H0 were rejected in 
horizontal, vertical and diagonal scanline respectively) agree 
with the rejection rates of pure uniformly distributed pseudo-
random noise sequences. 
 
Fig. 13. Hypotheses testing using Chi-square, χ², illustrating the uniform 
distribution of encrypted data. The RGB layers are concatenated. 
 
Fig. 14. Unencrypted data hypotheses testing failure using Chi-square, χ². 
The significance level is set to 0.01, the number of bins is 10 
and DOF v is 9; also, v may be set as 𝑣 = √𝐾 + 1 to be 
dynamically linked to the window size. Figure 14 shows H0 
rejection when processing the plain-image unencrypted data of 
“Lena-400” where H0 is rejected with 100% for all sliding 
window indices, the processing is achieved over a total number 
of 1599 sliding window shifts with an overlap of 50% resulting 
in 533 windows for each of the Red, Green and Blue layers. All 
encrypted images of Fig.2, with resolutions: 1024×1024, 
512×512, 400×400, 256×256 were tested for null hypothesis. 
Figure 15 shows the variation of the rate of the goodness of fit, 
RGOF, for the 16 analyzed images (48 tests) in horizontal, vertical 
and diagonal scanlines; it shows the values of RGOF for each 
resolution. It is observed that the ripples depend on the ratio 
between image resolution and sliding window size. Increasing 
the image size decreases the ripples around the mean of RGOF 
given by 0.9872 for the set of 48 test. The RGOF means for the 
set of images grouped into resolutions of 256, 400, 512 and 1024 
are 0.9879, 0.9878 0.9860 and 0.9872 respectively. The 
decrease of ripples with respect to image size is due to 
encryption being performed in a single block as given by the 
P_Key of (4); the characteristics are similar to those of pure 
uniform distribution white noise. 
  
Fig. 15. Multi-resolution rate of goodness of fit, RGOF, for tested images in 
horizontal, vertical and diagonal scanlines, NW =600. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, randomness evaluation of a symmetric genetic 
algorithm, GFHT, is presented. Pseudo-codes for both keys 
generation genetic algorithm implementation is presented first 
to show how such cipher is computationally efficient, after-
wards, the signal processing approach for randomness evalua-
tion is investigated based on random matrix theory circular law, 
power spectral density analysis, avalanche effect, 2-D 
autocorrelation, pixels randomness tests and chi-square, 2, 
hypotheses testing. Results show that encrypted images adopt 
the statistical behavior of uniform white noise; hence validating 
the theoretical model by experimental testing. The GFHT 
algorithm, implementing an OTP key scheme, is used for image 
communication, suitable for secure communication over open 
networks. The performance comparison with chaos-genetic 
ciphers is also carried out. 
APPENDIX:  UACI PROOF 
Let X and Y be two uniformly distributed and independent 
variables, with their values in the interval [0, L]. The uniform 
probability density functions of X, Y are given by: 
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𝑓௑(𝑥) = ቄ
1 𝐿⁄ if  𝑥 [0, 𝐿]
0 otherwise
   (29) 
𝑓௒(𝑦) = ቄ
1 𝐿⁄ if  𝑦 [0, 𝐿]
0 otherwise
   (30) 
The distance between the two variables X and Y distributed 
according to fX and fY is a new random variable given by 
𝑍 = |𝑌 − 𝑋|    (31) 
therefore, the expected value of the new variable Z, is   𝔼(𝑍) =
𝔼(|𝑌 − 𝑋|), where the absolute value as a distance measurement 
is defined by 
𝑔(𝑥, 𝑦) = |𝑦 − 𝑥| = ൜𝑦 − 𝑥 if 𝑦 ≥ 𝑥𝑥 − 𝑦 if 𝑥 ≥ 𝑦   (32) 
The joint probability density function, is the product of the 
probability density functions of X and Y; given by 𝑓ଡ଼ଢ଼(x, y) =
𝑓௑(𝑥)𝑓௒(𝑦) = 1 𝐿ଶ⁄  inside the squared space [0, L][0, L], where 
the expected value represents an area. Therefore, the expected 
value 𝔼(𝑍) = 𝔼(𝑔(𝑥, 𝑦)) is given by 
𝔼(𝑍) = ∫ ∫ 𝑔(𝑥, 𝑦)𝑓௑(𝑥)𝑓௒(𝑦)𝑑𝑥𝑑𝑦
௅
଴
௅
଴     
𝔼(𝑍) = ଵ
௅మ ∫ ∫ |𝑥 − 𝑦|𝑑𝑥𝑑𝑦
௅
଴
௅
଴      
𝔼(𝑍) = ଵ
௅మ
ቄ∫ ∫ (𝑥 − 𝑦)𝑑𝑦𝑑𝑥 +௫଴
௅
଴ ∫ ∫ (𝑦 − 𝑥)𝑑𝑦𝑑𝑥
௅
௫
௅
଴ ቅ          
𝔼(𝑍) = ଵ
௅మ
ቀ௅
య
଺
+ ௅
య
଺
ቁ = ௅
ଷ
                    (33) 
with L=255, the distance, Z, expected value is 𝔼(𝑍) = 85, while 
the normalized value represented by L=1, is 𝔼(𝑍) = 1 3⁄  or 
𝔼(𝑍) = 33.33% 
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